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Key Points
•	 Ukraine	is	a	country	in	need	of	deep	political,	economic	and	
social	reform.	After	coming	to	power	in	2010,	Viktor	Yanuko-
vych	 and	his	 government	 developed	 an	 ambitious	 and	 com-
prehensive	 programme	 of	 reforms	 across	 the	 key	 areas	 of	
social	 and	 political	 life.	A	 return	 to	 the	 presidential	 system	
of	 government	 just	 a	 few	months	 after	 the	 election	 allowed	
Viktor	Yanukovych	to	consolidate	more	power	than	any	oth-
er	Ukrainian	president	before	him.	This,	for	the	first	time	in	
years,	created	the	ideal	conditions	for	the	introduction	of	deep	
reforms	in	the	country.
•	 The	 constitutional	 changes,	which	 have	 given	 the	 president	
complete	 dominance	 on	 the	 Ukrainian	 political	 scene,	were	
initially	seen	as	a	step	which	could	ease	and	improve	the	gov-
ernance	of	the	state	and	as	a	way	to	implement	the	president’s	
reform	programme.	The	manner	in	which	these	changes	were	
carried	out,	however,	was	borderline	illegal	and	consequently	
led	to	a	gradual	erosion	of	political	competition,	resulting	in	
the	marginalization	of	Ukraine’s	opposition	parties	and	even	
the	Party	of	Regions’	coalition	partners.
•	 Several	of	the	planned	reforms	have	indeed	been	carried	out,	
or	at	least	initiated.	The	first	and	the	most	important	success	
achieved	 was	 the	 stabilisation	 of	 the	 public	 finances,	 fol-
lowing	Ukraine’s	most	serious	economic	crisis	ever	in	2009.	
It	should	be	stressed,	however,	that	this	was	achieved	not	only	
thanks	to	government	policy	but	also	thanks	to	the	financial	
assistance	provided	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund	and	
the	overall	recovery	of	global	markets	(which	impact	direct-
ly	 on	 the	 condition	of	 the	Ukrainian	 economy).	The	official	
goal	of	many	of	the	reforms	was	to	bring	Ukrainian	legisla-
tion	in	line	with	EU	law,	which	correlated	with	the	intense	
negotiations	 between	 Kiev	 and	 Brussels	 on	 an	 Association	
Agreement	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Deep	 and	 Comprehensive	
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Free	Trade	Area.	The	conclusion	of	these	negotiations	in	2011	
was	 seen	as	 a	great	 success	 and	a	 sign	of	 the	government’s	
administrative	efficiency.
•	 Nonetheless,	most	 of	 the	 planned	 reforms	have	 been	 imple-
mented	only	partially	or	still	remain	in	the	planning	stages.	
A	new	Tax	Code	has,	as	promised,	simplified	Ukraine’s	tax	law,	
but	its	numerous	inaccuracies	have	complicated	the	processes	
of	doing	business	for	small	and	medium-sized	enterprises.	The	
measures	undertaken	to	reform	the	gas	market	and	diversify	
Ukraine’s	 energy	 supplies	 have	 been	 slow	 and	 inconsistent.	
The	pension	reform	has	been	carried	out	only	partially,	and	
focused	mainly	on	raising	the	retirement	age.	The	attempts	to	
complete	land	reform	stalled	at	the	stage	of	developing	a	new	
land	market	law.
•	 In	many	other	areas,	the	government’s	performance	has	been	
even	 poorer.	 The	 authorities	 have	 failed	 to	 introduce	many	
long-awaited	 and	 fundamental	 reforms	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 local	
government,	municipal	infrastructure	and	housing	(the	gov-
ernment	has	now	been	working	on	 this	 legislation	 for	 eight	
years)	 and	 no	 progress	 has	 been	 made	 on	 the	 new	 Labour	
Code	(which	was	submitted	to	Parliament	back	in	2007).	The	
government’s	attempts	to	improve	the	investment	climate	in	
Ukraine,	believed	to	be	among	the	worst	in	Europe,	have	been	
equally	unsuccessful.	Since	the	welcome	adoption	of	the	Pub-
lic	Procurement	Act	in	2010,	Parliament	has	passed	a	number	
of	 amendments	 to	 the	 document.	 These	 amendments	 have	
been	 aimed	at	 excluding	 the	 compulsory	use	 of	 transparent	
tendering	 procedures.	 Similarly,	 the	 highly	 publicised	 anti-
corruption	campaign	has	turned	into	a	complete	failure.
•	 The	 reformist	 zeal	 of	Ukraine’s	 political	 elite	 had	 been	 pro-
gressively	 diminishing	 as	 the	 parliamentary	 election	 ap-
proached	and	the	polls	showed	a	decline	 in	support	for	both	
the	 president	 and	 the	 Party	 of	 Regions.	 During	 his	 time	 in	
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office,	Viktor	Yanukovych	has	been	unable	to	make	systemic	
changes,	and	his	new	powers	have	been	predominantly	used	
to	crush	his	political	opponents.	The	collapsing	economy	and	
the	results	of	the	recent	parliamentary	election	(which	effec-
tively	 rule	out	a	 stable	pro-presidential	majority	 in	 the	Ver-
khovna	Rada)	have	significantly	curtailed	any	chance	of	seri-
ous	reform	in	Ukraine,	at	least	until	after	the	2015	presidential	
election.	This	will	further	exacerbate	Ukraine’s	political,	so-
cial	and	economic	problems,	causing	the	country	to	be	left	far	
behind	its	Central	European	neighbours	or	even	Russia.
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introduction
Ukraine’s	 political	 and	 economic	 transformation	 after	 1991	was	
much	more	difficult	and	happened	more	slowly	than	in	the	neigh-
bouring	 countries	 across	 Central	 Europe	 and	 the	 Baltic	 region.	
This	was	partly	due	to	the	seeming	lack	of	prospects	for	EU	mem-
bership,	seen	as	the	main	stimulus	for	change	in	Central	Europe	
in	 the	 1990s,	and	more	recently	also	 in	 the	Balkans.	Even	more	
important,	however,	may	have	been	the	different	socio-historical	
experiences	 of	 the	 Ukrainian	 people	 and	 the	 different	mental-
ity	of	 their	political	elite.	 In	 the	first	 few	years	as	an	 independ-
ent	 state,	 following	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 Ukraine	
faced	challenges	on	a	scale	unseen	elsewhere	in	Central	Europe.	
It	witnessed	the	collapse	of	entire	industries	(including	its	heavy	
machinery,	 high	 technology,	 and	 arms	 industries),	 which	 had	
previously	been	closely	 linked	to	the	economies	of	other	former	
Soviet	republics.	With	 the	creation	of	customs	borders	between	
the	republics	in	1991,	however,	all	such	links	were	suddenly	sev-
ered.	The	Ukrainian	people,	accustomed	to	the	‘big	government-
small	 society’	model,	were	 now	 forced	 to	 find	ways	 to	 survive,	
with	 no	 hope	 of	 help	 from	 the	 state.	 The	 situation	was	 further	
compounded	by	hyperinflation,	 a	deep	economic	 crisis,	 and	 the	
weakness	of	the	newly	independent	country.	The	political	reins	in	
Ukraine	were	seized	by	Soviet-era	bureaucrats	and	administra-
tors.	Their	experience	of	governance,	however,	was	shaped	by	the	
highly	centralised	model	employed	by	 the	 former	Soviet	Union,	
and	completely	unsuited	to	the	new	circumstances.	These	Soviet-
era	 political	 circles	 produced	 the	 first	 generation	 of	 Ukrainian	
leaders,	which	might	explain	why	the	country’s	top	political	posi-
tions	have	never	been	filled	by	individuals	with	a	clear	vision	for	
transformation.
It	is	possible	to	delineate	periods	when	the	reforms	took	on	great-
er	momentum,	for	example,	at	the	beginning	of	President	Leonid	
Kuchma’s	 first	 term	 (1994-1999)	 and	 during	 the	 premiership	 of	
Viktor	Yushchenko	(1999-2001).	But	even	then,	the	reforms	were	
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limited	in	scope	and	were	quickly	abandoned	due	to	lack	of	popu-
lar	 support,	 and	 resistance	 from	officials	 and	growing	business	
groups	uninterested	in	change.	Large	domestic	businesses	(which	
created	the	so-called	oligarchs)	gained	unprecedented	 influence	
during	Leonid	Kuchma’s	presidency,	and	began	to	play	an	increas-
ingly	important	role	in	the	country’s	economy.	On	the	one	hand,	
these	businesses	were	 instrumental	 in	 spearheading	 the	neces-
sary	privatization,	on	the	other	hand,	they	prevented	attempts	at	
reforming	 and	 liberalising	 the	Ukrainian	 economy	 in	 line	with	
the	“Central	European	model”	(which	was	seen	as	dangerous	and	
overly	hasty	from	the	oligarchs	point	of	view).
In	late	2004	and	early	2005,	it	was	seemed,	that	the	impetus	for	
change	would	come	 from	the	Orange	Revolution	and	 the	 subse-
quent	election	of	Viktor	Yushchenko	as	president.	Initially,	Yush-
chenko	enjoyed	high	levels	of	public	support,	and	the	revolution	
itself	had	raised	hopes	for	fundamental	changes	in	Ukraine.	The	
five-year	period	following	the	Orange	Revolution,	however,	proved	
rather	disappointing	with	regard	to	political	and	economic	trans-
formation.	The	‘orange	team’	quickly	broke	up,	forming	two	mu-
tually	opposing	camps,	one	led	by	President	Viktor	Yushchenko,	
and	one	headed	by	Prime	Minister	Yulia	Tymoshenko.	This	lim-
ited	the	government’s	capacity	to	bring	about	change	and	resulted	
in	continuing	political	crises,	effectively	crippling	the	state.
Viktor	Yanukovych,	who	won	the	presidential	election	in	February	
2010,	 quickly	 consolidated	 all	 political	 power	 under	 the	 Party	 of	
Regions,	completely	marginalising	the	country’s	opposition	forces.	
After	amending	the	constitution	and	restoring	a	presidential	sys-
tem	of	government	in	Ukraine,	Yanukovych	took	control	of	Parlia-
ment	 and	 consequently	 became	 the	 country’s	most	 powerful	 po-
litical	figure	since	independence.	Furthermore,	both	the	president	
and	his	party	enjoyed	a	relatively	high	level	of	public	support.
President	 Yanukovych	 and	 the	 Party	 of	 Regions	 promised	 not	
only	to	stabilise	the	situation	after	the	chaotic	rule	of	the	‘orange	
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camp’,	but	also	 to	carry	out	 far-reaching	reform	of	 the	state	ap-
paratus.	The	political	coalition	 that	 formed	around	 the	Party	of	
Regions,	rebranded	itself	as	Stability	and	Reform.	The	new	gov-
ernment	had	a	strong	mandate	to	carry	out	reforms	–	a	real	need	
for	change	could	be	sensed	in	Ukrainian	society.	Subsequently,	in	
mid-2010,	the	president	published	a	reform	programme	for	2010-
-2014	 entitled	 “Wealthy	 society,	 competitive	 economy,	 effective	
state”,	which	constituted	 the	first	concrete	plan	 for	comprehen-
sive	reform	 in	years.	 Its	broad	scope	attempted	 to	address	most	
of	 the	challenges	facing	Ukraine,	ranging	from	the	stabilisation	
of	 the	 economy	 following	 the	 severe	 economic	 crisis,	 through	
changes	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 and	 agriculture,	 to	 social	 issues,	
such	as	new	funding	rules	for	health	care	and	education1.	The	two	
and	a	half	years	that	have	passed	since	the	announcement	of	the	
programme,	and	 the	recent	parliamentary	elections,	 seen	as	an	
important	milestone	in	Yanukovych’s	presidency,	provide	a	good	
opportunity	to	take	stock	and	evaluate	the	work	done	by	the	pres-
ident	and	the	Party	of	Regions.
This	paper	is	an	attempt	to	discuss	the	reform	measures	under-
taken	by	Ukraine’s	new	government.	It	should	be	stressed,	how-
ever,	that	the	authors	do	not	aim	to	offer	a	detailed	and	compre-
hensive	 analysis	 of	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 individual	 reforms	
have	 been	 completed;	 instead,	 the	 focus	 here	 is	 on	 the	 actions	
taken	by	the	government	and	the	observable	outcomes	in	several	
key	areas:	changes	to	Ukraine’s	political	system,	the	economy	and	
the	energy	sector.	This	analysis	can	then	be	used	to	discuss	the	
overall	changes	witnessed	in	Ukraine	since	the	beginning	of	2010,	
and	an	attempt	will	be	made	to	answer	why	the	reforms	have	been	
stalled,	and	what	the	future	holds	for	Ukraine.
1	 Full	version	available	from:	Заможне суспільство, конкурентоспроможна 
економіка,	ефективна держава. ПРОГРАМА ЕКОНОМІЧНИХ. РЕФОРМ НА	
2010	-	2014	роки;	http://www.president.gov.ua/docs/Programa_reform_FI-
NAL_1.pdf
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i. Political reforms
1. constitutional reform
One	of	the	conditions	that	made	it	possible	for	the	Orange	Revo-
lution	 to	 succeed	 in	 late	2004	was	Viktor	Yushchenko’s	 consent	
for	an	amendment	to	the	1996	Constitution,	which	would	change	
the	country’s	system	of	government	from	presidential	 to	parlia-
mentary-presidential.	 However,	 the	 changes,	 which	 took	 effect	
in	2006,	removed	the	certainty	of	cooperation	between	the	cen-
tral	bodies	of	the	Ukrainian	state.	Although	the	new	system	left	
the	president	 significantly	weakened,	he	 still	wielded	sufficient	
powers	to,	for	instance,	block	the	work	of	the	government.	Conse-
quently,	when	an	overt	conflict	ensued	between	President	Viktor	
Yushchenko	and	Prime	Minister	Julia	Tymoshenko	(as	well	as	be-
tween	President	Yushchenko	and	the	then	Prime	Minister	Yanu-
kovych	–	in	2006-2007),	the	work	of	the	executive	was	virtually	
paralysed.	The	problem	later	spilt	outside	the	arena	of	Ukraine’s	
domestic	politics.	Throughout	this	period,	Kiev	pursued	two	par-
allel	foreign	policies:	one	coordinated	by	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	
Affairs,	controlled	by	the	president,	and	the	other,	shaped	by	the	
deputy	prime	minister	for	foreign	relations.	On	many	occasions	
this	 had	 rather	 embarrassing	 consequences	 for	 Ukraine	 in	 its	
dealings	with	other	countries2.
After	2004,	the	Ukrainian	political	elite	was	aware	of	the	need	to	
reform	the	country’s	political	system,	but	could	not	agree	on	the	
direction	of	these	changes.	Some	politicians	argued	for	the	resto-
ration	of	the	presidential	system.	Among	the	strongest	proponents	
2	 For	example,	during	a	meeting	of	the	Ukraine-NATO	Commission	in	Brus-
sels,	5	March	2009,	attended	by	Ukraine’s	acting	Foreign	Minister	Volody-
myr	Khandogiy.	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Hryhoriy	Nemyria	also	 travelled	
to	Brussels	but	he	was	not	allowed	to	enter	the	room	since	the	Ukrainian	
delegation	 was	 officially	 headed	 by	 Khandogiy;	Огрызко рассказал, как 
Немырю унизили в штаб-квартире НАТО, Униан,	16.03.2009,	http://www.
unian.net/news/306014-ogryizko-rasskazal-kak-nemyiryu-unizili-v-
shtab-kvartire-nato.html
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of	strong	presidential	powers	was	Yulia	Tymoshenko.	Before	the	
constitutional	amendments	came	into	force	in	2006,	Tymoshenko	
urged	Yushchenko	to	ignore	them.	The	Party	of	Regions	also	pro-
claimed	the	need	to	return	to	a	presidential	system,	and	during	
the	presidential	 election	 campaign	 in	 2010,	 announced	plans	 to	
restore	the	1996	version	of	the	constitution.	Meanwhile,	other	po-
litical	groups	(including	the	Communist	Party	of	Ukraine)	were	
in	favour	of	reforms	that	would	further	limit	presidential	powers	
and	increase	the	powers	of	Parliament.
After	 Yanukovych’s	 victory	 in	 the	 2010	 presidential	 election,	
it	 was	 not	 clear	 whether	 he	 would	 be	 able	 to	 take	 full	 politi-
cal	control	of	 the	country.	At	 the	time,	Tymoshenko	still	served	
as	prime	minister,	and	enjoyed	extensive	powers	granted	to	the	
Prime	Miinister	by	the	2004	amendment	to	the	constitution,	and	
the	Ukrainian	parliament	was	dominated	by	a	majority	coalition	
formed	around	the	Yulia	Tymoshenko	Bloc	(BYuT).	Many	politi-
cal	commentators	believed	at	the	time	that	the	political	deadlock	
would	 continue,	 even	 if	 Yushchenko	 was	 replaced	 by	 Yanuko-
vych.	 The	 situation	 however	 unexpectedly	 changed.	 In	 early	
March	2010,	Verkhovna	Rada	altered	the	rules	under	which	po-
litical	parties	could	form	coalitions,	by	scrapping	the	previous	re-
quirement	that	coalitions	could	only	be	formed	by	whole	parlia-
mentary	factions3.	This	enabled	the	dissolution	of	Tymoshenko’s	
government	and	the	appointment,	in	March	2010,	of	a	new	cabi-
net	led	by	Mykola	Azarov.	The	change	to	the	parliamentary	regu-
lations	was	introduced	even	though	it	violated	a	2008	ruling	of	the	
Constitutional	Court	which	explicitly	prohibited	individual	MPs	
from	joining	parliamentary	coalitions.	In	April	2010,	however,	the	
Constitutional	Court	issued	a	new	ruling	that	permitted	the	prac-
tice.	The	Party	of	Regions	was	able	to	convince	17	MPs	from	Our	
Ukraine	and	the	BYuT,	as	well	as	the	Volodymyr	Lytvyn	Bloc	and	
3	 “The	Ukrainian	parliament’s	new	procedural	rules	pave	the	way	to	the	for-
mation	 of	 a	 new	 coalition”,	 EastWeek,	 OSW,	 10/03/2010,	 http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2010-03-10/ukrainian-parliaments-new-
procedural-rules-pave-way-to-formation-a-ne
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the	Communists,	which	was	sufficient	to	give	it	a	majority	in	par-
liament4.	Putting	an	end	to	several	years	of	cohabitation	paved	the	
way	for	a	more	effective	government,	but	Yanukovych	decided	to	
introduce	changes	that	would	grant	him	political	monopoly	in	the	
country.	Since	the	Party	of	Regions	did	not	have	enough	votes	to	
carry	out	constitutional	reform	(i.e.	at	least	300	votes),	it	decided	
to	use	Ukraine’s	Constitutional	Court	to	achieve	its	goals.	In	Octo-
ber	2010,	the	Court	reversed	the	2004	constitutional	reform	(even	
though	 in	2008	 the	Court	 refused	 to	consider	a	 similar	motion)	
claiming	that	the	changes	had	been	carried	out	unlawfully,	and	
thus	restored	the	1996	constitution5.	A	few	months	later	further	
changes	to	the	constitution	were	introduced,	including	a	move	to	
extend	the	parliamentary	term	from	four	to	five	years6.
Changes	to	Ukraine’s	system	of	government	have	contributed	to	
the	strengthening	of	presidential	powers	 to	an	extent	 that	gave	
opposition	 politicians	 grounds	 to	 accuse	 Viktor	 Yanukovych	 of	
authoritarianism.	 Serious	 concerns	 have	 also	 been	 voiced	 over	
the	very	manner	in	which	the	changes	were	introduced.	Amend-
ments	to	the	constitution	are	not	a	result	of	a	consensus	reached	
by	Ukraine’s	main	political	parties,	but	on	the	basis	of	a	decision	
of	the	Constitutional	Court,	only	five	years	after	the	reform	was	
implemented.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	Constitutional	Court	
is	an	institution	that	enjoys	little	public	trust	in	Ukraine,	and	few	
people	believe	in	its	independence.	And	although	no	laws	have	ac-
tually	been	broken,	there	is	little	doubt	that	laws	have	been	bent.	
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	clear	that	the	constitutional	amendments	
introduced	after	 the	Orange	Revolution	have	 ‘spoiled’	Ukraine’s	
4	 Рада призначила новий уряд: список міністрів,	 11/03/2010,	TCH,	http://
tsn.ua/ukrayina/rada-priznachila-novii-uryad.html
5	 The	 concerns	 raised	 by	 the	 Constitutional	 Court,	 regarding	 the	 manner	
in	 which	 the	 2004	 changes	 were	 made,	 were	 well-founded.	 For	 more,	 see	
Ukraine’s	 Constitutional	 Court	 reinstates	 presidential	 system,	 EastWeek,	
OSW,	06/10/2010,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2010-10	
-06/ukraine-s-constitutional-court-reinstates-presidential-system
6	 In	this	case,	the	Party	of	Regions	easily	found	300	votes,	as	many	of	the	MPs	
were	worried	they	might	not	be	able	to	return	to	Parliament	after	election.
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constitutional	system	and	have	consequently	become	one	of	 the	
main	causes	of	 the	current	paralysis	of	 the	country’s	executive,	
preventing	 any	 real	 reform	 during	 Yushchenko’s	 presidency.	
Ukraine’s	1996	constitution,	restored	in	2010,	provides	for	a	more	
transparent	 relationship	 between	 government	 agencies	 and	 al-
lows	for	more	effective	governance.	This	is	likely	to	be	the	main	
reason	why	the	West	raised	no	serious	criticism	about	the	manner	
in	which	the	constitutional	amendments	had	been	reversed.
2. administrative reform
Following	the	changes	to	Ukraine’s	system	of	government,	the	au-
thorities	planned	to	carry	out	deep	administrative	reform,	reduc-
ing	bureaucracy	(including	a	significant	reduction	in	the	number	
of	civil	 servants)	and	streamlining	 the	 functioning	of	 the	state.	
In	December	2010,	President	Yanukovych	reduced	the	number	of	
ministries	from	twenty	to	sixteen;	he	also	cut	the	number	of	dep-
uty	prime	ministers	from	six	to	three,	and	significantly	increased	
the	 responsibilities	 of	 those	who	kept	 their	 posts.	A	number	 of	
central	 government	bodies	were	 closed	down,	but	 over	 a	 dozen	
new	services	and	government	agencies	were	created7.
At	the	moment,	it	is	difficult	to	say	whether	the	reform	has	man-
aged	to	reduced	central	government’s	operating	costs;	it	is	clear,	
however,	 that	 in	most	 cases	 the	 changes	were	merely	 cosmetic.	
Many	 individuals	have	been	moved	 to	 other	posts,	 some	offices	
were	entirely	eliminated	by	combining	them	with	others;	many	
other	departments	have	been	renamed.	Despite	the	changes,	the	
government	has	failed	to	significantly	reduce	the	number	of	civil	
servants8	 and	 it	 is	hard	 to	 talk	 about	qualitative	 changes	or	 in-
creased	efficiency	of	the	respective	ministries.
7	 УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ № 1085/2010 Про оптимізацію системи 
центральних органів виконавчої влади, Президент України Віктор Яну-
кович – Офіційне інтернет-представництво,	 http://www.president.gov.
ua/documents/12584.html
8	 For	example,	the	number	of	redundancies	inside	the	Tax	Office	reached	11%	
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The	government	“advertised”	the	above	changes	as	the	first	stage	
of	a	 large	administrative	overhaul,	which	would	 lead	 to	 the	de-
centralisation	of	power	and	be	linked	to	a	long	overdue	local	gov-
ernment	reform9.	However,	despite	being	a	long-standing	slogan	
of	 the	ruling	Party	of	Regions,	 the	changes	 to	 local	government	
in	Ukraine	have	remained	in	the	drafting	stage	for	years.	Mean-
while,	the	form	of	government	adopted	by	President	Yanukovych	
has	been	leading	to	further	centralisation	of	power,	limiting	the	
already	weak	 decision	making	 powers	 of	 the	 country’s	 regions	
and	local	councils.
In	effect,	 the	administrative	 reform	announced	by	Yanukovych	
has	been	little	more	than	a	reorganisation	of	central	government	
bodies.	Many	of	the	acts	adopted	by	Parliament	to	pave	the	way	
for	the	aforementioned	reforms	have	been	criticised	as	unconsti-
tutional	 (including,	 the	so-called	Cabinet	Bill	of	 7	October	2010,	
which	gives	the	president	powers	to	appoint	even	deputy	minis-
ters	 and	deputy	heads	of	 other	 central	 government	bodies).	To-
gether	with	 the	 earlier	 changes	 to	 the	 constitution,	 these	 laws	
were	another	step	towards	even	greater	centralisation	of	power	
and	extension	of	presidential	prerogatives10	 (under	current	 law,	
the	president	also	appoints	the	heads	of	hundreds	of	regional	and	
local	governments).
instead	of	the	30%	requested	by	the	president.	ГНСУ лишь на треть выпол-
нила план по сокращению аппарата, Зеркало недели,	11/02/2012,
http://news.zn.ua/ECONOMICS/gnsu_lish_na_tret_vypolnila_plan_po_
sokrascheniyu_sotrudnikov-97168.html	
According	to	Ukraine’s	Civil	Service	Agency,	at	the	end	of	2011	the	number	
of	civil	servants	was	reduced	to	268,100	from	279,500	at	the	end	of	2010.	See:	
ДЕРЖАВНА СЛУЖБА В ЦИФРАХ	2012,	http://issuu.com/faina/docs/ds__v_
c2012?mode=window&pageNumber=6
9	 See:	Урядовий Кур’єр, Спеціяльний Випуск, 31.05.2012: Адміністратив-
на реформа: нова архітектура держуправління і територіальної органі-
зації влади:	 http://ukurier.gov.ua/media/documents/2012/05/30/admin-
spez.pdf
10	 See:	Административная реформа, или Обратно в СССР, Зеркало недели. 
Украина, №5, 11 февраля	2011,	http://zn.ua/POLITICS/administrativnaya_
reforma,__ili_obratno_v_sssr-75351.html	
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Finally,	a	series	of	personnel	changes	made	inside	the	cabinet	dur-
ing	Ukraine’s	 ‘administrative	reform’	have	allowed	Yanukovych	
to	 complete	his	plan	 to	monopolise	political	power	 in	 the	 coun-
try.	His	decision	to	remove	from	the	cabinet	the	representatives	
of	the	Party	of	Regions’	coalition	partners	(the	Communist	Party	
of	Ukraine,	and	particularly,	the	Lytvyn	Bloc)	was	another	clear	
sign	of	effective	marginalisation	of	the	role	of	coalition	partners.	
3. anti-corruption measures
Among	the	pledges	made	by	the	Party	of	Regions	during	the	presi-
dential	election	campaign	was	the	introduction	of	effective	anti-
corruption	measures	in	Ukraine.	Although	the	president’s	reform	
programme	for	2010-2014	did	not	specifically	address	this	issue,	
the	 campaign	 pledge	 was	 delivered	 when	 the	 Verkhovna	 Rada	
passed	 a	 law	 on	 preventing	 and	 combating	 corruption	 in	 April	
2011	–	which	was	subsequently	signed	into	law	by	the	president	on	
7	June	201211.	On	the	same	day,	the	president	also	signed	a	bill	that	
paved	the	way	for	a	series	of	amendments	to	existing	legislative	
acts	on	criminal	responsibility	for	acts	of	corruption.
Between	2010	and	2011,	the	new	measures	allowed	prosecutors	to	
bring	high-profile	corruption	charges	against	several	politicians	
and	hundreds	of	minor	government	officials.	The	anti-corruption	
zeal	was	relatively	strong	at	the	start	of	Yanukovych’s	presiden-
cy,	but	as	is	often	the	case,	it	dwindled	rather	quickly.	The	most	
likely	reason	for	this	is	that	in	countries	where	corruption	is	rife	
at	all	levels	of	government	and	public	administration,	a	strict	im-
plementation	of	anti-corruption	measures	can	upset	the	system,	
leading	to	high	levels	of	discontent	among	rank	and	file	officials	
11	 The	law	has	increased	the	scope	of	such	inspections;	a	greater	number	of	of-
ficials	are	now	monitored,	and	new	restrictions	have	been	added	(for	exam-
ple,	civil	servants	are	no	longer	permitted	to	accept	“gifts”	from	individuals	
or	businesses).	The	legislators	have	also	introduced	compulsory	annual	as-
set	declarations	for	officials	–	which	now	also	monitor	expenses.
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and	party	members,	whose	 loyalty	 is	 essential	 to	Yanukovych’s	
presidency.
The	two	most	publicised	arrests	were	those	of	Party	of	Regions	ac-
tivist,	Anatoliy	Hrytsenko,	and	the	head	of	the	State	Commission	
for	the	Regulation	of	Financial	Services	Markets,	Vasyl	Volha.	In	
Hrytsenko’s	 case,	 the	arrest	was	orchestrated	by	a	group	of	his	
political	 opponents	within	 the	 Party	 of	Regions12,	 and	 although	
Volha	was	officially	charged	with	accepting	a	bribe	of	$500,00013,	
it	is	likely	that	his	arrest	was	also	a	result	of	competition	between	
individual	business	groups.	An	additional	motive	for	both	arrests	
was	to	show	that	the	fight	against	corruption	in	Ukraine	was	not	
directed	only	at	the	government’s	political	opponents.
No	 investigations	were	 launched	 by	Ukraine’s	 law	 enforcement	
authorities,	however,	concerning	a	series	of	scandals	which	sur-
faced	after	Yanukovych	came	to	power.	Media	reports	often	high-
lighted	highly	 suspicious	 relations	between	 top	Ukrainian	poli-
ticians	and	businessmen,	unfair	 tendering	processes,	and	other	
practices	which	led	to	the	loss	of	billions	of	hryvnia	in	state	budget	
revenue.	Among	the	key	figures	mentioned	in	such	reports	were	
Deputy	Prime	Minister	and	Infrastructure	Minister,	Borys	Kole-
snikov	 (regarding	 tenders	 ahead	 of	 EURO	 2012),	 former	Deputy	
Prime-Minister	and	current	secretary	of	the	Council	of	National	
Security	and	Defence	of	Ukraine,	Andriy	Klyuev	(regarding	the	
use	of	EU	funds	to	develop	his	own	business),	and	Energy	Min-
ister,	Yuriy	Boyko	(regarding	the	purchase	of	oil	rigs	at	a	signifi-
cantly	inflated	cost14).	Based	on	the	media	reports	alone,	it	is	im-
12	 Party	of	Regions	activist	arrested	in	Crimean,	EastWeek,	OSW,	02/02/2011,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2011-02-02/
aresztowanie-krymskiego-dzialacza-partii-regionow	
13	 Ильченко Александр, Рафал Анастасия, Волге шьют взятку на полмилли-
она долларов, Сегодня,	 20.07.2011,	 http://www.segodnya.ua/news/	1426-
9	556.html
14	 The	first	oil	rig	cost	the	state-owned	Naftogaz	$400	million,	despite	its	mar-
ket	value	of	approximately	$250	million.
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possible	to	determine	whether	the	politicians	were	in	fact	guilty	
of	 these	 charges,	 but	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 official	 response	 from	 the	
prosecutor’s	office	or	the	Security	Service	of	Ukraine	might	sug-
gest	that	the	authorities	are	not	interested	in	investigating	cases	
of	alleged	corruption	among	Ukraine’s	top	state	officials.
Figure 1.	Corruption	Perceptions	Index,	Ukraine
source:	Transparency	International
The	 continued	 lack	 of	 effective	 anti-corruption	 measures	 in	
Ukraine	has	translated	into	the	country’s	performance	in	inter-
national	corruption	perceptions	rankings.	In	the	2011	Transpar-
ency	 International	 Corruption	 Perceptions	 Index,	 Kiev	 ranked	
152nd	out	of	183	countries,	receiving	just	2.3	out	of	10	points15.	As	
shown	 in	Figure	 1,	 the	situation	has	been	steadily	deteriorating	
since	2006,	when	Ukraine	recorded	its	best	result	ever.	It	is	clear,	
however,	that	corruption	has	been	a	big	problem	not	only	for	the	
current	 government	 but	 for	 previous	 administrations	 also,	 as	
Ukraine’s	performance	in	Transparency	International’s	ranking	
began	to	fall	in	the	days	of	the	“Orange”	government.	A	small	im-
provement	in	Ukraine’s	performance	in	2010	was	due	to	the	an-
ti-corruption	 campaign	 launched	by	 the	 then	new	government;	
15	 http://www.transparency.org/country#UKR_DataResearch
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nonetheless,	as	the	campaign	proved	to	be	more	about	propagan-
da	than	real	change,	this	upward	trend	was	short	lived.	
Nevertheless,	the	index	compiled	by	Transparency	International	
does	not	measure	the	real	level	of	corruption	in	the	country	but	
only	public	perception	of	this	phenomenon.	Reports	produced	by	
other	organisations,	however,	are	equally	damning.	A	study	car-
ried	out	by	the	Organization	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Devel-
opment	(OECD),	for	instance,	described	Kiev’s	progress	between	
2008-2011	as	negligible.	The	OECD	report	presented	an	evaluation	
of	the	Ukrainian	reforms	as	part	of	a	larger	project	developed	un-
der	the	Istanbul	Anti-Corruption	Action	Plan.	According	to	this	
report,	Ukraine	had	managed	to	meet	only	one	of	the	twenty-four	
recommendations	made	by	the	OECD.	In	a	separate	report	cover-
ing	twenty-five	European	countries,	Ernst	&	Young	put	Ukraine	
last	but	one,	ahead	only	of	Russia.	As	many	as	91%	of	businesses	
reported	 that	bribery	was	commonplace	 in	Ukraine.	More	 than	
half	of	them	(55%)	believed	that	in	2011	the	situation	had	got	even	
worse.	 Similarly,	 the	 European	 Business	 Association16,	 which	
measures	corruption	levels	in	terms	of	the	total	cost	of	bribes	to	
individual	businesses	in	relation	to	their	total	revenue,	reported	
that	between	2008	and	2011	corruption	had	increased	by	almost	
70%	and	companies	were	now	spending	up	to	10%	of	their	income	
on	bribes17.
Some	legislative	measures,	such	as	the	Public	Procurement	Act,	
which	introduced	a	relatively	transparent	system	of	bidding	for	
government	contracts,	have	been	positively	assessed	in	the	West.	
However,	the	Verkhovna	Rada	has	gradually	introduced	a	series	
of	 exemptions	 to	 the	 bidding	 process,	 thus	 creating	 conditions	
for	 large-scale	 fraud.	On	 1	August	 2012,	 the	president	 signed	an	
16	 Ukraine’s	largest	organisation	representing	the	interests	of	foreign	inves-
tors	in	the	country.
17	 http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/investklimat_vesna_otkladyvaetsya-100872.
html
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amendment	 to	 the	Public	Procurement	Act,	which	 repealed	 the	
mandatory	tendering	procedures	for	state-owned	companies.
Interestingly,	 the	authorities	 are	well	 aware	of	 the	 scale	of	 cor-
ruption	and	 the	damage	 caused	by	 it.	 In	 the	 spring	of	 2012,	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Justice	 produced	 a	 special	 report	 on	 corruption	 in	
Ukraine,	in	which	it	acknowledged	that	the	corrupt	practices	had	
remained	at	a	consistently	high	level	for	10	years	and	affect	virtu-
ally	all	spheres	of	life.	The	document	also	highlighted	that	for	83%	
of	Ukrainians,	corruption	has	become	a	fact	of	life18.	In	his	address	
to	the	nation	earlier	this	year,	President	Yanukovych	also	noted	
that	bureaucratic	inertia	and	corruption	were	the	two	major	ob-
stacles	to	Ukraine’s	modernisation	efforts19.
18	 Юлия Рябчун, Во взятках несчастье. Минюст отчитался об уровне кор-
рупции в Украине, Коммерсант-Украина,	 18.04.2012,	 http://www.kom-
mersant.ua/doc/1918091
19	 Януковичу-реформатору заважають «інертні, корумповані бюрократи», 
Униан,	 03.07.2012,	 http://www.unian.ua/news/512577-yanukovichu-refor-
ma	toru-zavajayut-inertni-korumpovani-byurokrati.html
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ii. economic reforms
1. macroeconomic stabilisation
Ukraine’s	economy	remains	heavily	dependent	on	the	exports	of	
low-processed	products,	particularly	steel	products	and	iron	ore,	
which	account	for	30-40%	of	the	total	value	of	Ukrainian	exports.	
These	types	of	products	are	very	sensitive	to	fluctuations	in	world	
markets.	Neither	Leonid	Kuchma’s	government,	nor	the	new	po-
litical	 leaders	who	 came	 to	 power	 after	 the	Orange	 Revolution,	
did	much	to	change	the	structure	of	the	country’s	economy,	even	
though	this	was	a	period	of	economic	growth	in	the	world,	which	
also	translated	into	rapid	growth	in	Ukraine.
The	negative	consequences	of	excessive	reliance	on	foreign	eco-
nomic	trends	became	particularly	clear	after	the	2008	global	fi-
nancial	crisis,	whose	ripples	reached	Kiev	several	months	later.	In	
2009,	Ukraine’s	economy	collapsed,	with	GDP	figures	plummeting	
by	almost	15%.	This	was	caused	mainly	by	a	combination	of	factors	
described	earlier.	Some	of	the	responsibility	though	also	lay	with	
the	then	Prime	Minister	Yulia	Tymoshenko,	whose	populist	poli-
cies,	pursued	in	the	midst	of	an	election	campaign,	had	a	particu-
larly	negative	impact	on	local	businesses	and	the	banking	sector.	
Following	Kiev’s	failure	to	meet	its	obligations,	the	International	
Monetary	Fund	decided	to	suspend	its	cooperation	with	Ukraine	
in	November	2009.
Mykola	 Azarov’s	 government,	 which	 came	 to	 power	 in	 March	
2010,	 was	 able	 to	 stabilise	 Ukraine’s	 economy	 quite	 quickly.	 It	
should	be	noted	though	that	Azarov	was	aided	in	this	task	by	an	
economic	upturn	in	Ukraine’s	major	export	markets	that	started	
in	the	second	half	of	2009,	and	the	assistance	Kiev	received	from	
the	 IMF.	 In	2010,	 the	government	 resumed	 its	 cooperation	with	
the	IMF	and	was	granted	a	credit	line	of	$15.1	billion.	IMF’s	sup-
port	for	Ukraine	and	favourable	ratings	by	credit	rating	agencies	
allowed	 the	 government	 in	 Kiev	 to	 attract	 funds	 from	 abroad.	
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Thanks	to	an	upward	trend	in	global	markets,	Ukraine’s	growth	
reached	 4.2%	 in	 2010	 and	 5.2%	 in	 2011.	 The	Azarov	 government	
also	managed	to	reduce	the	budget	deficit	to	1.4%	of	GDP.	The	eco-
nomic	 revival	 did	not	 last	 long,	 however,	 and	 in	 2012	Ukraine’s	
economy	began	to	slow	down	(see	Figure	2).
The	IMF	loans	for	Ukraine	were	granted	on	the	condition	that	Kiev	
would	carry	out	a	series	of	reforms.	In	2010,	the	government	met	
most	of	the	conditions	set	by	the	IMF	with	regard	to	budget	sta-
bility,	monetary	policy	and	changes	to	tax	law.	Other	conditions	
included	 raising	 the	 retirement	 age	 for	 women	 and	 increasing	
gas	tariffs	for	individual	consumers	to	reflect	the	market	prices	
of	gas.	Although	 (after	much	hesitation)	 the	authorities	eventu-
ally	agreed	to	press	ahead	with	state	pension	reform	(more	on	this	
in	subsection	Pension	reform),	the	government	kept	delaying	the	
agreed	gas	price	hike.	This	subsequently	prompted	the	IMF	to	sus-
pend	the	disbursal	of	the	remaining	loan	instalments	at	the	end	
of	201020.	The	government’s	reformist	zeal	was	further	blunted	in	
late	2010	by	the	largest	wave	of	protests	to	sweep	Ukraine	during	
Yanukovych’s	presidency,	sparked	by	the	reform	of	Ukraine’s	tax	
law	(see	subsection	“Tax	reform”).
20	 Sławomir	 Matuszak,	“Ukraine’s	 cooperation	 with	 the	 IMF	 –	 unfulfilled	
hopes	for	deeper	reforms”,	OSW	Commentary,	15/06/2011,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-06-15/ukraines-cooperation-
imf-unfulfilled-hopes-deeper-reforms
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figure 2. Ukraine’s	GDP	growth	rate	between	2000-2012
source:	The	Ukrainian	Office	for	National	Statistics	
After	the	IMF	suspended	its	cooperation	with	Ukraine,	the	gov-
ernment	in	Kiev	began	to	struggle	to	service	its	national	debt.	Al-
though	Ukraine’s	national	debt	level	remains	relatively	low,	espe-
cially	when	compared	with	most	EU	countries	(36%	of	GDP	at	the	
beginning	of	2012;	but	16	percentage	points	higher	than	in	2008),	
the	problem	lies	in	the	fact	that	much	of	Ukraine’s	national	debt	
is	 short-term	 debt.	 Kiev’s	 falling	 credit	 rating	means	 that	 gov-
ernment	bonds	have	very	high	 interest	rates	 (an	average	of	 14%	
for	domestic	holders).	In	the	last	two	quarters	of	2012,	Ukraine’s	
economic	downturn	has	turned	into	a	full-blown	recession21,	rais-
ing	 concerns	 about	 the	 solvency	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 state	 in	 2013,	
with	 its	highest	 foreign	debt	 repayments	and	 servicing	charges	
in	 years22.	 Given	 the	 deteriorating	 relations	 between	 Kiev	 and	
the	West	(where	economic	problems	are	also	quite	serious),	Rus-
sia	might	turn	out	to	be	the	only	country	willing	to	help	Ukraine.	
21	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 “Ukrainian	 economy	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 recession”,	 OSW	
Commentary,	 21/11/2011,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-
mentary/2012-11-21/ukrainian-economy-verge-recession
22	 In	2013	 the	Ukrainian	government	will	have	 to	pay	on	 this	account	about	
$9	billion.	See:	http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id-
=245876222&cat_id=244823857	
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In	the	past,	Moscow	has	on	several	occasions	provided	financial	
assistance	to	the	government	in	Kiev,	and	in	contrast	to	the	IMF,	
its	 loans	have	never	been	 conditional	 on	 the	 implementation	of	
unpopular	reforms23.
Meanwhile,	Kiev	has	also	been	facing	a	series	of	other	challeng-
es.	Ukraine’s	 grey	economy,	 for	 instance,	has	been	estimated	at	
40-60%	of	the	country’s	GDP.	And	although	both	the	current	and	
the	previous	governments	have	pledged	to	reduce	 it,	 in	practice	
this	has	entailed	an	increase	of	the	tax	burden	on	small	and	me-
dium-sized	businesses	(while	offering	preferential	conditions	for	
big	 business	 linked	 to	 Viktor	 Yanukovych),	 thereby	 provoking	
many	 SMEs	 into	 evading	 their	 tax	 liabilities.	 Directly	 affected	
by	the	global	economic	crisis,	Ukraine’s	banking	sector	has	been	
described	 by	 international	 financial	 institutions	 as	 the	 weak-
est	 in	 the	 region.	Although	 in	 the	first	half	of	 2012,	 local	banks	
posted	the	first	profit	 in	three	years	 ($210	million),	 the	sector	 is	
still	struggling	with	high	levels	of	bad	loans24.	The	instability	of	
Ukraine’s	banking	sector	is	further	compounded	by	low	levels	of	
trust	among	their	customers,	which	could	easily	turn	into	panic	
and	a	mass	withdrawal	of	deposits.	
2. tax reform
In	 the	autumn	of	 2010,	 the	Verkhovna	Rada	adopted	Ukraine’s	
new	Tax	Code,	consolidating	into	a	single	document	all	the	indi-
vidual	tax	regulations	previously	contained	in	various	statutes.	
Ukraine’s	 previous	 tax	 laws	 had	 been	 described	 as	 among	 the	
most	complex	in	the	world,	and	in	the	World	Bank’s	2010	Doing	
Business	 report,	Ukraine’s	 tax	 system	was	 ranked	 181st	 in	 the	
23	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	 “Ukraine	 is	 becoming	 dependent	 on	Russian	 loans”,	
EastWeek,	 OSW,	 04/04/2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/east-
week/2012-04-04/ukraine-becoming-dependent-russian-loans
24	 Елена Губарь, Банки накопили проблем, Коммерсант Украина,	06.08.2012,	
http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1996123
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world	 (out	of	 183)25.	The	new	tax	code	has	reduced	 the	number	
of	state	taxes	from	29	to	18,	while	the	number	of	local	taxes	has	
dropped	 from	 14	 to	 5.	 The	 corporate	 income	 tax	 rate	 has	 been	
cut	 from	25%	 in	 2010	down	 to	 21%	 in	 2012	 (towards	 a	 target	 of	
16%	by	2014	–	which	will	make	it	the	lowest	in	Europe).	The	new	
tax	code	has	also	created	two	tax	bands	for	 individual	 taxpay-
ers	at	15%	and	17%,	although	one	of	 its	most	 important	 innova-
tions	 has	 been	 the	 introduction	 of	 automatic	 VAT	 refunds	 for	
businesses.	This	provision	is	the	first	serious	attempt	in	years	to	
tackle	Ukraine’s	national	debt	 towards	 local	businesses,	which	
resulted	from	overdue	VAT	refunds.	(The	government	addressed	
the	problem	by	issuing	its	debtors	with	so-called	VAT-bonds	in	
summer	2010).
Although	the	new	Tax	Code	simplified	the	country’s	tax	rules,	it	
sparked	violent	demonstrations	by	small	businesses	(the	so	called	
Tax	Maydan	action),	which	were	attended	by	tens	of	 thousands	
of	people26.	The	 largest	opposition	was	voiced	to	the	abolition	of	
a	lump-sum	tax	and	the	introduction	of	restrictions	on	the	use	of	
simplified	taxation.	The	Tax	Code	also	significantly	increased	the	
powers	 of	 tax	 inspectors	dealing	with	businesses.	The	new	 law	
was	also	accused	of	favouring	big	business,	although	it	would	be	
fairer	to	say	that	the	lawmakers	simply	chose	not	to	increase	the	
tax	burden	on	large	companies	any	further.
It	is	hard	to	provide	a	clear	evaluation	of	the	Tax	Code,	especially	
since	 hundreds	 of	 amendments	 have	 already	 been	made	 to	 the	
document,	 and	 proposals	 for	 further	 changes	 are	 continuously	
being	put	forward.	The	new	tax	law	does	indeed	increase	the	tax	
burden	on	small	and	medium-sized	businesses,	but	 it	 should	be	
noted	that	the	previous	rules	on	a	lump-sum	tax	actually	fuelled	
25	 http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Docu-
ments/Annual-Reports/English/DB10-FullReport.pdf
26	 Mass	protests	by	Ukrainian	entrepreneurs	against	a	new	tax	law,	OSW,	East-
Week,	 17/11/2010,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2010-11-17/
mass-protests-ukrainian-entrepreneurs-against-a-new-tax-law
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tax	 avoidance.	 The	main	 positive	 outcome	 of	 the	 reform	 is	 the	
codification	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 tax	 law,	which	 allows	 for	 greater	
transparency.
3. Pension reform
Although	 the	Ukrainian	 state	pension	 is	 relatively	 low,	pension	
spending	remains	a	heavy	burden	on	the	country’s	budget,	with	
the	Ukrainian	Pension	Fund	permanently	in	the	red.	In	2011,	the	
Pension	 Fund’s	 deficit	 reached	 $3.8	 billion,	 which	 amounted	 to	
nearly	 10%	of	 the	Ukrainian	budget27.	 In	addition,	as	mentioned	
previously,	the	issue	of	pensions	for	women	was	one	of	the	main	
stumbling	blocks	in	Kiev’s	negotiations	with	the	IMF.	Before	the	
reform,	the	state	pension	age	for	men	was	60	and	55	for	women,	
making	it	among	the	lowest	in	the	world.	The	average	life	expec-
tancy	of	people	reaching	retirement	age,	meanwhile,	was	62	for	
men	and	80	for	women28.
It	came	as	no	surprise	that	the	Party	of	Regions	tried	its	hard-
est	to	avoid	making	such	an	unpopular	decision.	In	September	
2011,	however,	after	months	of	preparation,	the	Verkhovna	Rada	
finally	passed	a	pension	reform	bill	that	increased	the	state	pen-
sion	age	for	women	from	55	to	6029.	The	MPs	also	limited	the	max-
imum	size	of	the	state	pension	to	ten	times	the	minimum	wage	
(currently,	the	equivalent	of	$955	dollars).	The	restrictions,	how-
ever,	will	apply	only	to	new	pensioners,	while	existing	pensions	
27	 Дефіцит Пенсійного фонду за 2011 рік перевищив 30 млрд.грн.,	16.03.2012,	
http://news.liga.net/ua/news/economics/627778-def_tsit_pens_ynogo_
fondu_za_2011_r_k_perevishchiv_30_mlrd_grn.htm
28	 http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/country-health-profile/ukraine
In	Ukraine,	the	average	life	expectancy	for	men	remains	low	at	62,	the	aver-
age	life	expectance	for	women	is	74;	http://www.who.int/countries/ukr/en/
29	 The	government	has	 also	 extended	 the	minimum	contribution	period	 for	
the	basic	earnings-related	pension,	from	20	to	30	years	for	women	and	from	
25	to	35	years	for	men.	While,	the	minimum	contribution	period	for	the	basic	
state	pension	(set	at	50%	of	the	minimum	SERPS	pension)	has	been	extended	
from	5	to	15	years.
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exceeding	this	amount	will	remain	unchanged.	The	new	pension	
rules	took	effect	from	1	October	2011,	although	a	three-year	tran-
sition	period	was	 introduced	during	which	women	can	choose	
whether	 they	want	 to	 take	early	retirement	on	 less	 favourable	
terms,	or	take	advantage	of	the	new	rules30.	The	reform	has	been	
welcomed	by	a	number	of	international	financial	organisations	
(including	the	EBRD).
In	practical	terms,	the	reform	has	raised	the	state	pension	age	and	
increased	the	period	of	contribution,	but	has	not	changed	the	pen-
sion	system	itself.	Of	interest	here	will	be	the	planned	launch	of	oc-
cupational	pensions	and	private	pension	funds,	which	would	un-
doubtedly	create	conditions	for	the	development	of	the	Ukrainian	
financial	market	and	would	generate	capital	that	could	be	used	for	
domestic	 investment.	Although	the	pension	reform	bill	does	pro-
vide	for	the	introduction	of	occupational	pensions,	it	is	difficult	to	
predict	when	such	a	scheme	could	be	rolled	out.	The	two-year	time-
frame	initially	proposed	by	the	legislators	has	become	completely	
unrealistic	due	to	the	current	economic	situation	and	the	state	of	
public	finances	in	Ukraine.	Under	these	proposals,	contributions	to	
occupational	pension	schemes31	were	to	be	charged	from	the	mo-
ment	the	state	managed	to	balance	the	budget	of	the	state	Pension	
Fund.	So	far,	however,	any	attempts	to	reduce	its	deficit	have	been	
unsuccessful;	in	mid-2012	the	government	took	the	decision	to	in-
crease	the	deficit	from	$0.9	billion	to	$2	billion32.
30	 Новая пенсионная реформа в Украине: на ком хотят сэкономить?, Mo-
jazarplata.com.ua,	 24.08.2012,	 http://mojazarplata.com.ua/ru/main/	work-
legislation/novaja-pensionnaja-reforma-v-ukraine-na-kom-hotjat-se-
konomitq
31	 Starting	at	2%	of	monthly	earnings,	with	an	annual	1%	increase,	up	to	7%.	
Initially,	the	contributions	would	be	administered	by	the	state-run	Pension	
Fund,	and	after	two	years	–	following	the	launch	of	private	pensions	–	con-
tributions	could	be	transferred	to	private	pension	funds.
32	 Дефицит Пенсионного фонда Украины будет увеличен почти в два 
раза, Корреспондент.net,	 19.07.2012,	 http://korrespondent.net/business/
economics/1362086-deficit-pensionnogo-fonda-ukrainy-budet-uvelichen-
pochti-v-dva-raza
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In	2012,	the	Ukrainian	authorities	also	failed	to	adopt	a	new	La-
bour	Code.	A	draft	of	the	Code	was	submitted	to	Parliament	back	
in	2007	and	successfully	passed	first	reading	a	year	later;	in	Sep-
tember	2012,	however,	 the	bill	was	 taken	off	 the	parliamentary	
agenda.	Consequently,	the	repeatedly	amended	1971	Labour	Code	
adopted	by	the	Verkhovna	Rada	of	the	Ukrainian	Soviet	Socialist	
Republic	still	remains	in	force.	
4. investment climate
Each	new	Ukrainian	government	announces	measures	aimed	at	
improving	the	country’s	investment	climate,	hoping	to	obtain	the	
foreign	capital	necessary	to	modernise	the	country.	In	the	after-
math	of	the	Orange	Revolution,	during	a	period	of	economic	boom	
in	Ukraine,	several	large	Western	investors	entered	the	country,	
especially	in	the	banking	and	the	steel	sectors.	This	did	not	mean,	
however,	that	investment	conditions	were	attractive.	Foreign	in-
vestors	complained	about	corruption,	bureaucracy	and	a	complex	
legal	system	and	selective	application	of	the	law.
Improving	the	investment	climate	in	Ukraine	was	therefore	one	
of	the	most	important	aspects	of	Yanukovych’s	economic	reform	
programme.	Two	years	later,	it	is	clear	that	the	government	has	
failed	 completely	 in	 this	 area.	 Compared	 to	 2010,	 Ukraine	 has	
slipped	 in	almost	 all	 the	 rankings	of	 economic	 freedom	and	 in-
vestment	conditions33.	A	survey	of	foreign	companies	operating	in	
Ukraine,	 conducted	by	 the	European	Business	Association,	 sug-
gests	 that	 the	 investment	 climate	 in	 the	 country	 is	 worse	 now	
than	during	the	economic	crisis	of	2009.
In	order	to	improve	the	situation,	however,	Ukraine	does	not	nec-
essarily	need	new	legal	frameworks	but	rather	a	complete	over-
haul	of	its	business	practices.	A	common	problem	faced	by	com-
panies	operating	in	the	country	is	the	behaviour	of	various	local	
33	 See:	Sławomir	Matuszak,	Oligarchic	democracy,	OSW	Studies,	p.60.
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control	institutions,	that	issue	permits	and	licenses,	the	law	en-
forcement	agencies,	or	even	the	local	secret	service	officers,	who	
use	their	positions	to	extort	bribes	from	businesses.	In	addition,	
state	agencies	are	often	used	to	remove	unwanted	business	com-
petitors	from	the	market.	Unable	to	seek	justice	in	the	highly	cor-
rupt	 local	courts,	most	businesses	have	no	choice	but	to	pay	the	
bribes.	The	 investment	climate	has	also	been	adversely	affected	
by	the	increasing	anti-market	tendencies	in	Ukraine’s	economic	
policy,	for	example	with	regard	to	privatisation34.
In	 the	 long	 term,	 some	 improvement	 could	 come	 from	 the	 im-
plementation	 of	 the	 2011	 Deep	 and	 Comprehensive	 Free	 Trade	
Area	(DCFTA)	agreement	negotiated	between	Kiev	and	the	Eu-
ropean	 Union	 (initialled	 on	 19	 July	 201235).	 It	 is	 believed	 that	
thanks	 to	 the	 implementation	of	some	parts	of	 the	EU’s	acquis	
communautaire,	 the	 DCFTA	 should	 help	 create	 a	 better	 busi-
ness	 environment	 in	Ukraine.	However,	 despite	Kiev’s	 success	
in	completing	these	negotiations,	at	present	the	signing	and	the	
ratification	of	an	Association	Agreement	(of	which	the	DCFTA	is	
an	integral	part)	seem	rather	unlikely.	Further	progress	on	the	
EU-Kiev	agreements	will	depend	primarily	on	a	lasting	solution	
to	Ukraine’s	internal	political	problems,	which	were	the	reason	
for	the	EU’s	decision	to	freeze	the	process	of	signing	and	ratify-
ing	these	deals.
34	 Over	the	past	two	years,	privatisation	in	Ukraine	focused	mainly	on	elec-
tricity	 companies	 and	 the	 natural	 gas	 distribution	 sector.	 In	 both	 cases,	
winning	bids	were	often	unofficially	announced	before	the	bidding	process	
was	 closed.	 Consequently,	Ukraine’s	 big	 business	 (with	 close	 links	 to	 the	
president)	monopolised	both	sectors	 (Rinat	Akhmetov	 took	control	of	 the	
electricity	sector;	while	Dmytro	Firtash	bought	up	Ukraine’s	gas	distribu-
tion	networks).
35	 Rafał	Sadowski,	 “The	prospects	 for	 the	EU-Ukraine	 free	 trade	agreement”,	
OSW	Commentary,	18/10/2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
commentary/2012-10-18/prospects-euukraine-free-trade-agreement
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5. land market reform
Ukraine	has	some	of	the	most	fertile	soils	in	the	world	and	a	cli-
mate	favourable	to	agriculture.	So	far,	however,	the	food	and	ag-
ricultural	 sector	has	not	 contributed	 to	 the	Ukrainian	economy	
on	a	scale	reflecting	its	potential.	One	of	the	obstacles	to	its	devel-
opment	has	been	the	long-lasting	land	reform,	particularly	with	
regard	to	land	ownership	and	the	possibility	of	unrestricted	sale	
and	purchase	of	agricultural	land.	Consecutive	Parliaments	have	
voted	 to	extend	 the	moratorium	on	 the	 free	 sale	of	agricultural	
land.	Regardless	of	the	political	opposition,	mostly	based	on	the	
negative	social	perception	of	agricultural	reforms,	the	extension	
of	the	moratorium	has	been	justified	by	the	lack	of	legal	and	insti-
tutional	frameworks	that	would	allow	unrestricted	sale	of	 land.	
As	a	result,	the	development	of	agriculture	in	Ukraine	has	been	
based	on	the	leasing	of	land	from	small	landowners	(namely,	vil-
lagers	who,	in	the	1990s,	were	given	ownership	of	so-called	“Pai”	
holdings,	that	is,	small	plots	of	land	inherited	from	Ukraine’s	now	
dismantled	 collective	 farms).	 Farmland	 lease	 agreements	 have	
enabled	 the	 creation	of	 large-scale	 farms	and	agricultural	 com-
panies,	some	of	which	now	control	hundreds	of	thousands	of	hec-
tares	 of	 agricultural	 land.	 It	 has	 been	 estimated	 that	 Ukraine’s	
twenty	 largest	 agricultural	 companies	 are	 currently	 leasing	 an	
area	equal	to	the	size	of	Belgium36.	The	creation	of	“super	farms”	
in	Ukraine	is	a	characteristic	feature	of	the	way	in	which	this	sec-
tor	has	been	developing	since	 the	 1990s,	and	 it	also	sets	out	 the	
likely	direction	of	its	further	development.
President	 Yanukovych’s	 government	 has	 announced	 plans	 to	
complete	the	land	reform	and	introduce	civilised	rules	for	the	sale	
and	purchase	of	agricultural	land.	This	announcement	was	part-
ly	the	result	of	pressure	from	the	farming	lobby,	which	seeks	to	
36	 Составлен рейтинг самых крупных землевладельцев Украины,	 lb.ua,	
15.07.2012,	 http://economics.lb.ua/food/2012/06/15/156433_sostavlen_reyt-
ing_samih_krupnih.html
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legalise	its	“super	farms”,	and	partly	because	Ukraine’s	left	wing	
parties	(the	most	vocal	opponents	of	the	reform)	have	gradually	
lost	 their	 influence.	 In	addition,	although	the	Ukrainian	society	
is	split	on	the	issue	(roughly	in	half),	it	seems	that	the	reform	at-
tracts	less	controversy	than	in	the	1990s.	Significant	progress	was	
made	with	 the	passing	of	 the	Land	Register	bill	 in	August	2011,	
which	introduced	a	simplified	mechanism	for	the	keeping	of	land	
records37.	 The	 land	 registration	 process	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 com-
pleted	by	2015.	Meanwhile,	Parliament	has	received	a	draft	bill	on	
the	land	market,	which,	if	passed,	would	create	the	legal	basis	for	
the	introduction	of	unrestricted	sale	and	purchase	of	farmland	in	
Ukraine	–	 this	 is	 the	 last	of	 the	bills,	without	which	a	 free	 land	
market	could	not	be	established.	Under	the	proposed	law,	Ukrain-
ian	 farmland	 could	 only	 be	 purchased	 by	 Ukrainian	 nationals,	
although	foreign	investors	would	be	allowed	to	lease	agricultural	
land	from	local	freeholders.	The	bill	also	includes	a	series	of	re-
strictions	aimed	at	hindering	market	speculation	and	over-con-
centration	of	land	ownership	(for	example,	through	the	levying	of	
high	taxes	on	sales	within	five	years	of	purchase)38.	The	bill	was	
successfully	passed	at	first	reading	in	December	2011,	but	despite	
plans	 to	move	 it	 forward,	 its	 second	 reading	was	not	 scheduled	
before	the	2012	parliamentary	elections.	The	plans	to	permit	land	
sale	in	Ukraine	have	attracted	criticism	from	a	number	of	politi-
cal	parties.	Among	the	main	opponents	of	the	reform	have	been	
the	national-democratic	political	 forces,	 as	well	 as	 the	Commu-
nists,	who	in	the	2007-2012	Parliament	helped	form	the	ruling	co-
alition	and	are	also	now	seen	as	potential	allies	of	the	ruling	Party	
of	Regions	in	the	newly	elected	Verkhovna	Rada.	The	work	on	bill	
has	also	come	under	a	fair	amount	of	pressure	from	the	different	
lobbies	trying	to	affect	the	final	shape	of	its	individual	provisions.	
37	 “Towards	the	introduction	of	free	land	trade	in	Ukraine”,	EastWeek,	OSW,	
10/08/2011,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-08-10/
to	wards-introduction-free-land-trade-ukraine
38	 ВР приняла в первом чтении закон о земле, Униан,	 09.12.2011,	 http://
www.unian.net/news/473413-vr-prinyala-v-pervom-chtenii-zakon-o-zem-
le.html
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Consequently,	 the	Party	of	Regions	has	decided	 to	postpone	 the	
vote	on	 the	bill	until	after	 the	parliamentary	elections	 (held	on	
28	October	2012).	On	20	November	2012,	however,	the	Verkhovna	
Rada	voted	to	once	again	extend	the	moratorium	on	the	sale	and	
purchase	of	agricultural	land	–	this	time	until	2016.	The	prospect	
of	completing	the	Ukrainian	land	reform	in	the	near	future	has	
become	rather	unrealistic.
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iii. energy sector
1. gas sector reform
One	 of	 the	main	 causes	 of	 Kiev’s	 financial	 difficulties	 has	 been	
the	high	price	of	natural	gas	imported	from	Russia	–	the	source	
of	about	two	thirds	of	all	gas	consumed	in	Ukraine.	The	current	
pricing	 formula	used	by	 the	Russians,	however,	 is	based	on	 the	
2009	gas	 contracts	 signed	by	 former	Ukrainian	Prime	Minister	
Yulia	 Tymoshenko.	 The	 other	 important	 reason	why	 the	 state-
owned	Naftogaz	has	been	making	a	loss	and	requires	heavy	sub-
sidies	from	the	state	budget39	has	been	insufficient	transparency	
and	the	lack	of	reforms	in	the	Ukrainian	gas	sector.
Although	any	change	in	the	pricing	formula	would	require	a	rene-
gotiation	of	the	current	contracts,	a	reform	of	Ukraine’s	gas	sector	
depends	entirely	on	the	will	of	the	government	in	Kiev.	Further-
more,	given	that	approximately	75%	of	 the	EU’s	gas	 imports	are	
transported	through	Ukraine,	Brussels	is	also	interested	in	help-
ing	to	create	a	transparent	gas	market	in	the	country.	To	this	end,	
Brussels	has	suggested	that	Kiev	adopt	the	EU’s	internal	regula-
tions	 on	 the	 energy	 sector.	 The	 first	 document	 paving	 the	way	
for	such	cooperation	was	adopted	by	Tymoshenko’s	government	
back	in	March	2009.	At	the	time,	the	EU	and	Ukraine	signed	the	
so-called	Brussels	Declaration,	 in	which	 the	EU	endeavoured	 to	
guarantee	that	international	financial	institutions	would	provide	
the	funding	for	the	modernisation	of	the	Ukrainian	gas	pipelines,	
as	long	as	Ukraine	agreed	to	reform	its	gas	sector.	However,	due	
39	 The	exact	budget	deficit	at	Naftogaz	is	hard	to	estimate.	The	2011	figure	stood	
at	$2.5	billion,	while	the	2012	estimates	range	from	$1.5	billion	(according	to	
the	government)	to	as	much	as	$5.7	billion	(according	to	some	experts).	
See:	 Бойко нашел способ уменьшить дефицит «Нафтогаза»,	 lb.ua,	
11.06.2012,	http://economics.lb.ua/state/2012/06/11/155594_boyko_nashel_
spo	sob_	umenshit_defitsit.html	
and,	 http://www.rbc.ua/rus/finance/show/v-2012-g-defitsit-naftogaza-sos-
ta	vit-47-mlrd-grn---analitiki-27042012173400
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to	 the	outbreak	of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 in	Ukraine	and	 the	 start	
of	another	election	campaign,	the	government	in	Kiev	never	even	
started	the	reforms.
Later,	 Yanukovych’s	 government	 did	 implement	 some	 changes	
that	 brought	 Ukraine’s	 gas	 sector	 regulations	 in	 line	 with	 EU	
standards.	In	July	2010,	for	example,	the	president	signed	into	law	
a	bill	reforming	the	national	gas	market,	which	included	legal	pro-
visions	for	the	separation	of	extraction,	transportation	and	sales	
into	different	financially	and	legally	independent	companies.	 In	
addition,	 in	 February	 2011,	 Kiev	 joined	 the	 Energy	 Community	
(EC)40.	Despite	the	obligations	stemming	from	Ukraine’s	member-
ship	of	this	organization	and	the	earlier	adoption	of	the	gas	mar-
ket	law,	Kiev	took	its	time	before	implementing	any	of	the	chang-
es.	In	fact,	the	first	real	change	did	not	come	until	2012.	In	April	of	
last	year,	Parliament	adopted	amendments	to	the	Ukrainian	law	
on	pipeline	transport,	removing	an	earlier	ban	on	the	restructur-
ing	of	Naftogaz	and	its	subsidiaries	involved	in	gas	transit.	Under	
the	amendments,	changes	to	the	structure	of	the	group	can	now	
be	made	by	the	government	without	Parliament’s	approval.	The	
amended	law,	however,	keeps	in	place	the	earlier	restrictions	on	
the	privatisation	of	those	parts	of	the	Naftogaz	group	which	are	
responsible	 for	 transit	 (namely,	 the	 pipelines	 carrying	 Russian	
gas	to	the	rest	of	Europe).	In	June	2012,	the	government	separated	
from	Naftogaz	 two	 of	 its	 subsidiaries:	Ukrtranshaz	 responsible	
for	 transportation,	 and	 Ukrgazvydobuvannya	 focusing	 on	 ex-
traction.	And	finally	in	autumn	2012,	Naftogaz	lost	its	monopoly	
40	 An	organization	established	in	2005	to	create	a	common	energy	market	un-
der	EU	regulations.	Its	members	include	the	EU	member	states,	seven	Bal-
kan	states,	 as	well	 as	Ukraine	and	Moldova.	Kiev	has	agreed	 to	adopt	EU	
regulations	(the	so-called	third	energy	package)	by	January	2015).
See:	Wojciech	 Konończuk	 and	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	 “Ukraine	 &	Moldova	
and	the	Energy	Community”,	EastWeek,	OSW,	28/03/2012,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-03-28/ukraine-moldova-and-ener-
gy-community
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on	the	import	of	gas	to	Ukraine	(introduced	in	2008	by	Yulia	Ty-
moshenko’s	government).
The	legislative	changes	do	not	however	indicate	the	future	direc-
tion	of	the	gas	sector	reform.	The	Ukrainian	government	claims	
that	 the	 reform	will	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 re-
quirements	of	the	Energy	Community,	although	Russia	will	un-
doubtedly	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 this	 reform.	 Yanukovych’s	
ministers	have	been	trying	to	renegotiate	the	unfavourable	con-
ditions	 agreed	 in	 the	 2009	 gas	 contracts	 –	 albeit	without	much	
success.	 In	 exchange	 for	 such	 concessions	 (including	 lower	 gas	
prices),	Moscow	 seeks	 effective	 control	 over	 the	 Ukrainian	 gas	
sector.	So	far,	Kiev	has	resisted	the	pressure	from	Russia,	but	 it	
is	possible	that	in	the	future	Ukraine	will	be	forced	to	give	in	to	
Moscow.	For	years,	the	lack	of	reform	to	the	gas	sector	has	limited	
transparency,	which	some	businessmen	(with	links	to	the	succes-
sive	governments)	have	used	to	their	advantage.	Therefore,	if	the	
separation	of	extraction,	transportation	and	sale	of	gas	into	dif-
ferent	financially	and	legally	independent	companies	were	to	go	
ahead	as	planned	by	2015,	Ukraine	could	witness	fierce	competi-
tion	for	the	takeover	of	the	most	profitable	of	the	new	companies	
–	particularly	 in	 the	gas	extraction	sector.	This,	however,	could	
have	highly	unpredictable	consequences.
The	reform	of	the	energy	sector	requires	decisive	and	courageous	
decisions,	 including	 significant	 gas	 price	 hikes	 for	 individual	
consumers	and	district	heating	schemes,	as	part	of	a	comprehen-
sive	 strategy	 to	modernise	 Ukraine’s	municipal	 housing	 sector.	
Although	 these	 changes	 are	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 priorities	 in	 the	
president’s	reform	programme,	their	implementation	has	been	as	
slow	and	inconsistent	as	the	reform	of	the	gas	sector.	At	the	end	
of	2011,	the	government	set	up	the	National	Communal	Services	
Regulation	Commision	of	Ukraine	(an	independent	body	regulat-
ing	the	provision	of	communal	services	market,	which	under	the	
president’s	plans	was	 to	be	established	by	 the	end	of	 2010).	The	
Ukrainian	 business	 is	 getting	 ready	 for	 the	 privatisation	 of	 the	
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local	services	market.	Meanwhile,	 in	September	2012,	 the	Verk-
hovna	Rada	took	off	the	agenda	a	proposal	for	a	new	Housing	Code,	
which	is	necessary	to	deal	with	the	current	complicated	and	ex-
tensive	legal	frameworks	preventing	change	in	the	housing	sector	
(including	the	creation	of	the	so-called	OSBBs,	or	associations	of	
co-owners	of	multi-apartment	residential	buildings).	Despite	the	
significance	of	the	document,	Parliament	has	failed	to	pass	it	for	
the	past	eight	years.
2. attempts to diversify ukraine’s gas supplies
Ukraine	has	one	of	 the	most	 energy-intensive	economies	 in	 the	
world.	 According	 to	 local	 estimates,	 the	 amount	 of	 energy	 re-
quired	to	produce	one	unit	of	GDP	in	Ukraine	is	3	to	5	times	higher	
than	in	Central	Europe.	The	country	is	also	heavily	dependent	on	
energy	imports,	mainly	from	Russia.	As	a	result,	successive	gov-
ernments	 in	Kiev	have	been	 stressing	 the	need	 to	diversify	 the	
country’s	energy	supply	(especially	gas)	but	little	has	been	done	to	
put	words	into	action.	Initially,	after	taking	power	in	2010,	Viktor	
Yanukovych	and	his	government	did	not	 treat	 this	matter	 seri-
ously:	the	president’s	2010	reform	programme	made	no	mention	
of	the	need	for	the	diversification	of	Ukraine’s	gas	supplies.	Kiev’s	
failure	 in	 gas	negotiations	with	Russia,	 however,	 has	 prompted	
a	U-turn	on	the	issue.
One	of	the	“flagship”	projects	under	the	new	policy	was	a	planned	
construction	of	an	LNG	terminal	with	a	target	capacity	of	10	bil-
lion	m3,	which	would	allow	Ukraine	to	import	gas	from	Azerbaijan	
or	the	Middle	East.	Work	on	the	project	was	launched	in	August	
2010,	under	the	so-called	National	Projects	initiative	–	a	series	of	
state-run	programmes	 aimed	 at	modernising	 the	 country	 –	 but	
little	progress	was	made	over	the	next	two	years.	In	early	2012,	the	
Spanish	company	Socoin	completed	a	feasibility	study	which	the	
government	tentatively	approved	on	8	August	2012.	Commenting	
on	the	signing	of	an	agreement	with	Spain’s	Gas	Natural	Fenosa	
and	US-based	Excelerate	Energy,	under	which	the	parties	would	
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create	 a	 consortium	 of	 investors	 for	 the	 LNG	 terminal	 project,	
Prime	Minister	Azarov	proudly	announced	on	26	November	2012:	
“This	is	a	historic	moment…	We’ve	taken	the	first	really	big	step	
in	securing	Ukraine’s	energy	independence”.	However,	later	that	
day,	the	Spanish	company	denied	signing	the	deal	with	Ukraine	
and	rejected	reports	suggesting	that	it	had	been	represented	at	the	
meeting	by	the	person	named	by	Ukrainian	officials	as	the	com-
pany’s	official	representative.	Kiev	tried	to	play	down	the	scandal	
and	quoted	“technical	difficulties”	as	the	cause	of	the	confusion41.	
Subsequently,	the	government	was	forced	to	admit	that	the	Span-
ish	signatory	 to	 the	alleged	“agreement”	did	not	have	powers	of	
attorney	to	sign	it,	the	documents	did	not	mention	any	financial	
or	legal	obligations,	and	no	“historic	moment”	ever	happened.	The	
scandal	(and	loss	of	credibility)	notwithstanding,	the	project	has	
raised	a	number	of	concerns.	The	expected	timeframe	and	total	
cost	of	the	project	is	believed	to	be	too	optimistic42.	Another	prob-
lem	is	the	lack	of	adequate	infrastructure	in	Azerbaijan	to	export	
its	liquefied	gas	(Azerbaijan	is	being	considered	as	the	main	LNG	
supplier	for	the	project)	as	well	as	possible	difficulties	in	securing	
Turkey’s	permission	for	transit	of	gas	tankers	through	its	straits.
In	November	2012,	Ukraine	was	able	 to,	 for	 the	first	 time	 in	 its	
history,	 successfully	 import	gas	 from	across	 its	western	border.	
After	months	 of	 negotiations,	 Kiev	 signed	 a	 contract	with	 Ger-
man’s	RWE	for	the	supply	of	56.7	million	m3	of	gas	to	Ukraine.	The	
gas	was	transported	through	Poland	in	November	and	December	
2012.	Due	to	the	limited	capacity	of	this	particular	transit	route,	
Ukraine	is	currently	in	talks	with	RWE	to	re-route	this	year’s	gas	
41	 The	Spanish	signatory	to	the	agreement	was	only	asked	to	stand	in	when	the	
official	delegation	from	Gas	Natural	Fenosa	was	delayed	on	the	way	to	the	
meeting.	
42	 On	a	visit	to	Qatar	in	November	of	last	year,	President	Yanukovych	said	that	
the	first	shipment	of	gas	under	the	new	project	could	reach	Ukraine	at	the	
beginning	of	2015;	which	seems	rather	unrealistic	due	to	delays	at	the	plan-
ning	stage.	The	official	value	of	the	project	has	been	estimated	at	€865	mil-
lion,	 although	 some	 commentators	 have	 suggested	 that,	 based	 on	 similar	
projects	abroad,	the	real	cost	could	be	much	higher.
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supplies	 through	 Hungary.	 Ukrainian	 Energy	 Minister,	 Yuriy	
Boyko,	has	said	that	 in	2013	Kiev	would	 like	to	use	this	route	to	
import	5	billion	m3	of	gas.	Regardless	of	whether	these	plans	ma-
terialise,	true	diversification	of	Ukraine’s	gas	supplies	is	severely	
limited	by	the	amount	of	gas	that	could	be	imported	to	Ukraine	
from	the	West.
A	more	viable	alternative	might	be	to	increase	Ukraine’s	domes-
tic	 production.	 Currently,	 locally	 extracted	 gas	 can	meet	 about	
a	third	of	the	country’s	annual	gas	needs.	A	rise	in	domestic	pro-
duction,	however,	 is	 being	held	back	by	 the	 lack	 of	 appropriate	
technology	and	financial	resources	to	cover	the	investment	costs.	
Initially,	the	Ukrainian	government	was	hoping	to	attract	Russian	
investors	to	the	project.	In	late	2010	and	early	2011,	Naftogaz	and	
Gazprom	signed	a	memorandum	establishing	a	joint	venture	that	
would	extract	fire	damp	(mine	gas)	in	Ukraine,	while	a	separate	
agreement	 was	 inked	 by	 Chornomornaftogaz	 (a	 Naftogaz	 sub-
sidiary)	and	Lukoil	for	joint	prospecting	on	the	Black	Sea	shelf43.	
However,	it	is	not	in	the	interest	of	Russian	companies	(especially	
Gazprom)	to	support	gas	production	in	Ukraine.	As	a	result,	Kiev	
has	turned	to	the	West	with	an	offer	to	cooperate.	In	May	2012,	the	
government	selected	the	winning	bids	for	shale	gas	exploration	at	
two	sites;	the	successful	bids	came	from	Chevron	and	Shell.	If	the	
actual	size	of	shale	gas	deposits	at	 the	two	sites	matches	earlier	
estimates,	both	companies	may	invest	up	to	$7	billion	in	develop-
ing	the	fields44.	The	government	has	also	invited	Western	compa-
nies	to	develop	conventional	gas	deposits	on	its	Black	Sea	shelf.	In	
August	2012,	a	consortium	of	US	companies	 led	by	Exxon	Mobil	
won	a	tender	for	the	extraction	of	oil	and	gas	at	the	Skifsky	field.	
43	 “Ukraine:	Naftohaz	and	Gazprom	announce	the	establishment	of	joint	ven-
tures”,	EastWeek,	OSW,	29/12/2010,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
eastweek/2010-12-29/ukraine-naftohaz-and-gazprom-announce-estab-
lishment-joint-ventures
44	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	“Western	oil	companies	will	invest	in	Ukraine”,	EastWeek,	
OSW,	22/08/2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-08-22/
western-oil-companies-will-invest-ukraine
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The	site	has	been	estimated	to	hold	up	to	35	billion	m3	of	gas,	and	
the	required	investment	may	reach	$10-12	billion45.	In	both	cases,	
the	start	of	production	on	an	industrial	scale	would	coincide	with	
the	 ending	of	Kiev’s	 gas	 contracts	with	Russia.	 If,	 by	 that	 time,	
Ukraine	also	managed	to	launch	the	planned	LNG	terminal,	the	
country’s	relations	with	Russia	could	change	dramatically.	
The	most	tangible	results	in	this	area	could	be	ensured	through	
a	significant	reduction	of	gas	imports	from	Russia.	Based	on	data	
from	 late	2012,	Ukraine	 imported	about	34	billion	m3	of	Russian	
gas	(down	from	about	40	billion	m3	in	2011	and	36.5	billion	m3	in	
2010);	 of	 this,	 26	billion	m3	was	purchased	under	 the	Naftogaz-
Gazprom	contract.	In	view	of	the	continuing	high	prices	Ukraine	
has	to	pay	Russia	for	its	gas,	Kiev	has	indicated	that	in	2013	Naf-
togaz	might	 reduce	 the	 level	of	Russian	gas	 imports	down	to	as	
little	as	20	billion	m3.	The	resulting	gas	shortage	on	the	Ukrainian	
energy	market	could	then	be	filled	thanks	to	 the	“reverse-flow”	
supplies	 from	 Europe	 (RWE)46.	 Such	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	
Russian	gas	imports,	however,	would	violate	the	provisions	of	the	
2009	contracts,	which	set	the	minimum	annual	purchase	level	at	
33	billion	m3		47.	Consequently,	ensuring	good	relations	with	Rus-
sia	–	Ukraine’s	major	gas	partner	–	is	seen	as	a	top	priority	by	the	
government	in	Kiev.	In	view	of	the	above,	Ukraine’s	“diversifica-
tion	policy”	appears	to	be	less	of	a	conscious	energy	strategy,	and	
more	of	a	negotiating	tactic	aimed	at	creating	an	impression	that	
Ukraine	has	access	to	alternative	sources	of	gas,	which	might	win	
it	some	concessions	from	Moscow.
45	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	“Western	oil	companies	will	invest	in	Ukraine”,	op.cit.
46	 http://news.zn.ua/ECONOMICS/ukraina_esche_bolshe_sokratit_zakup-
ki_gaza_v_rossii_i_uvelichit_import_iz_evropy-112200.html
47	 The	 contract	 contains	 a	 “take	 or	 pay”	 clause;	 although	 the	 addenda	
signed	 in	2010	effectively	removed	the	provisions	on	the	types	and	the	
size	of	penalties	for	contractual	violations,	they	did	not	repeal	the	“take	
or	pay”	clause	itself.
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iV. assessment of the current situation 
and ProsPects for the future
1. assessment of the current situation 
A	return	 to	 the	presidential	 system,	coupled	with	a	 stable	and	
disciplined	parliamentary	majority,	has	given	President	Viktor	
Yanukovych	 unprecedented	 political	 powers.	 Even	 President	
Kuchma,	who	enjoyed	equally	extensive	powers	but	was	stalled	
by	the	 fragmentation	of	his	political	base,	could	not	match	Ya-
nukovych’s	 capacity	 for	 implementing	 change.	 The	 concentra-
tion	 of	 power	 and	 relative	 stability	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 economy	
between	2010-2011,	created	ideal	conditions	for	the	implementa-
tion	of	the	deep	reforms	proposed	by	the	president	in	2010.	Ya-
nukovych’s	position	was	additionally	 strengthened	by	 the	 fact	
that	he	had	managed	to	completely	marginalise	Ukraine’s	oppo-
sition	forces48.	This	was	made	possible	in	large	part	by	eliminat-
ing	the	main	leader	of	the	Ukrainian	opposition	from	the	politi-
cal	scene,	Yulia	Tymoshenko.	In	addition,	the	opposition	parties	
appeared	 to	 lack	 an	 even	basic	 awareness	 of	how	 to	 engage	 in	
serious	politics,	not	 to	mention	a	complete	 lack	of	a	viable	and	
coherent	political	strategy	for	the	country,	which	had	been	re-
placed	by	a	series	of	populist	slogans.
As	a	result,	after	years	of	political	deadlock,	Yanukovych’s	presi-
dency	created	an	opportunity	 to	 implement	 real	 reforms	 in	 the	
country.	Several	of	them	have	now	been	completed	while	others	
are	still	in	progress.	Among	them	was	the	highly	unpopular	pen-
sion	reform,	which	raised	the	state	pension	age.	In	2010,	after	the	
initial	chaos	that	followed	the	global	economic	crisis,	the	govern-
ment	managed	 to	get	 the	public	finances	under	control.	Several	
good	decisions	have	also	been	made	regarding	the	diversification	
of	 Ukraine’s	 gas	 supplies,	 although	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
48	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 situation	 in	 Ukraine	 is	 no	 longer	 comparable	
to	the	circumstances	in	Russia	or	Belarus.	
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government’s	 actions	 came	 rather	 late	 and	have	not	 as	 yet	pro-
duced	tangible	results.	Nonetheless,	compared	with	the	govern-
ments	that	followed	the	Orange	Revolution	and	failed	to	carry	out	
any	serious	reform	(between	2005	and	2010),	Yanukovych’s	presi-
dency	has	been	quite	successful.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	
during	this	period	Viktor	Yanukovych	was	briefly	prime	minis-
ter	(2006-2007),	while	Yulia	Tymoshenko	never	had	the	chance	to	
govern	alone	and	lacked	a	stable	parliamentary	base.
On	 the	 other	 hand,	most	 areas	 of	 life	 in	 Ukraine	 have	 seen	 no	
significant	 change	under	Yanukovych,	while	 in	many	other	 ar-
eas	the	situation	has	deteriorated.	Contrary	to	the	official	policy	
of	 liberalisation	 and	deregulation	 of	 the	 economy,	 protectionist	
tendencies	favouring	big	business	linked	to	the	president	and	his	
political	 allies	have	 intensified	 (as	 can	be	 seen	 in	 the	privatisa-
tion	of	the	Ukrainian	energy	and	gas	sector).	At	the	same	time,	the	
pressure	on	small	and	medium-sized	businesses	has	been	rising,	
both	with	regard	to	the	tax	burden	as	well	as,	for	example,	wide-
spread	extortion	practices	(often	blamed	on	Yanukovych’s	politi-
cal	allies).	The	government	has	failed	to	implement	effective	anti-
corruption	measures	and	the	investment	climate	in	the	country	is	
as	bad	as	during	the	2009	economic	crisis.
On	 the	 whole	 therefore	 Yanukovych’s	 performance	 between	
2010	 and	 2012	 leaves	 much	 to	 be	 desired.	 And	 although	 after	
coming	to	power,	the	current	government	did	implement	some	
unpopular	 but	 necessary	 changes,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 determine	 the	
extent	to	which	these	measures	were	the	result	of	a	genuine	de-
sire	for	change,	rather	than	a	response	to	objective	and	external	
factors,	including	the	economic	crisis	and	the	need	for	financial	
assistance	 from	 the	 IMF.	 Similarly,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 resist	 the	 im-
pression	that	the	efforts	towards	the	diversification	of	Ukraine’s	
gas	suppliers	stemmed	from	the	failure	of	Yanukovych’s	policy	
on	Russia	and	 the	unsuccessful	attempts	 to	negotiation	a	revi-
sion	of	 the	2009	gas	contracts.	 It	 is	 safe	 to	say	 though	that	 the	
great	potential	and	the	favourable	conditions	mentioned	earlier,	
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have	now	been	wasted.	The	consolidation	of	political	power,	ini-
tially	 seen	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	
real	reforms	in	the	country,	was	subsequently	used	to	gradually	
remove	 Yanukovych’s	 opponents	 from	 the	 Ukrainian	 political	
scene.	This,	in	turn,	scuppered	Ukraine’s	chance	to	sign	an	As-
sociation	Agreement	with	the	EU	in	2011	and	build	a	Deep	and	
Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area.	Nonetheless,	the	completion	of	
negotiations	on	both	agreements	should	be	seen	as	a	significant	
achievement	 of	 the	 Ukrainian	 negotiators	 and	 an	 unclaimed	
success	of	Yanukovych’s	presidency.
Still,	since	political	power	in	Ukraine	is	currently	concentrated	in	
the	hands	of	the	president,	it	is	he	who	must	take	full	responsibil-
ity	 for	 the	outcomes	of	his	policies.	Viktor	Yanukovych,	despite	
his	many	accomplishments,	turned	out	to	be	incapable	of	imple-
menting	complex,	systemic	change.	It	is	difficult	to	say	whether	
this	stems	from	his	reluctance	to	bring	about	change	that	could	
upset	 his	 supporters	 in	 big	 business,	 or	whether	 he	 lacked	 the	
courage	to	push	through	unpopular	reforms	when	public	support	
for	the	government	began	to	drop.	This	question	also	remains	un-
answered	after	the	recent	parliamentary	elections.
2. Prospects for the future
The	 results	 of	 the	 parliamentary	 election	 held	 on	 28	 October	
2012	suggest	that	there	is	 little	chance	of	substantial	reforms	in	
Ukraine,	at	 least	until	2015,	when	the	country	will	hold	 its	next	
presidential	election.	Despite	securing	a	nominal	victory,	the	pro-
presidential	Party	of	Regions	may	nonetheless	struggle	to	main-
tain	a	stable	majority	in	the	Verkhovna	Rada.	This	is	simply	be-
cause	finding	loyal	coalition	partners	is	always	easier	in	times	of	
economic	prosperity	than	in	times	of	crisis.
The	economic	situation	in	Ukraine	remains	very	challenging.	The	
country’s	GDP	figures	for	the	second	half	of	2012	showed	the	first	
signs	 of	 decline	 in	 years,	while	 the	 preliminary	figures	 for	 the	
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whole	of	2012	show	growth	of	just	0.2%	-	the	worst	performance	of	
the	Ukrainian	economy	since	the	2009	crisis49.
However,	unlike	in	2010,	when	the	economy	began	to	bounce	back	
(having	 bottomed	 out	 during	 the	 crisis),	 the	 economic	 outlook	
for	2013,	for	both	Ukraine	and	other	markets,	is	rather	subdued.	
This	is	particularly	worrying	for	the	government	in	Kiev	because	
Ukraine’s	economic	performance	is	directly	linked	to	the	econom-
ic	conditions	on	Ukraine’s	main	export	markets.	(As	much	as	60%	
of	Ukraine’s	GDP	is	generated	through	exports).
These	very	harsh	economic	conditions	require	austere	economic	
policies,	without	which	Ukraine	could	not	secure	financial	assis-
tance	from	the	West	in	the	future.	Such	measures	though,	coupled	
with	the	expected	intensification	of	radical	and	populist	demands	
of	 the	 Ukrainian	 opposition,	 could	 drastically	 reduce	 Yanuko-
vych’s	chances	of	 re-election.	 It	 is	 therefore	 likely	 that	 the	gov-
ernment	will	make	only	small	changes	addressing	the	most	press-
ing	issues	and	will	refrain	from	carry	out	large	reforms	necessary	
to	secure	external	funding,	such	as	a	rise	in	gas	prices	or	a	more	
flexible	exchange	rate.	The	government	will	probably	press	ahead	
with	 the	gas	sector	reform,	although	 the	exact	direction	of	 this	
reform	is	not	clear	and	will	likely	depend	on	the	outcome	of	Kiev’s	
negotiations	with	Moscow	on	changes	 to	 the	2009	gas	contract.	
Work	might	also	continue	on	the	law	legalising	the	sale	and	pur-
chase	of	agricultural	land,	although	the	recent	decision	to	extend	
the	 current	 moratorium	 until	 2016	 suggests	 the	 possibility	 of	
a	long	and	fierce	debate	in	Parliament,	coinciding	with	a	presiden-
tial	campaign.
It	 is	 unlikely	 that	 as	 we	 move	 closer	 to	 the	 2015	 presidential	
election,	 the	 government	 will	 take	 any	 unpopular	 decisions	 or	
49	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 “Ukrainian	 economy	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 recession”,	 OSW	
Commentary,	 21/11/2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-
mentary/2012-11-21/ukrainian-economy-verge-recession
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carry	out	reforms	adversely	affecting	individual	business	groups.	
Therefore,	 small-scale	 changes	 are	 going	 to	 be	 directed	 at	win-
ning	over	the	electorate	and	trying	to	maintain	social	spending	
above	the	level	of	inflation.	This	will	undoubtedly	lead	to	a	bigger	
budget	deficit	and	higher	levels	of	public	debt,	which	in	itself	will	
block	any	major	reforms.	Over	the	next	two	years,	Yanukovych	is	
going	to	focus	on	his	re-election,	and	in	order	to	win	he	will	try	to	
avoid	antagonising	local	oligarchs.	This	last	element	will	be	par-
ticularly	important	as	despite	his	best	efforts	he	has	so	far	failed	
to	create	a	business	empire	that	would	end	his	reliance	on	cam-
paign	donations	from	big	business50.	Any	attack	on	the	interests	
of	 the	Ukrainian	oligarchs	 (which	could	be	caused	by	 the	deep-
ening	economic	crisis	and	the	need	for	radical	action	to	increase	
state	revenues)	would	leave	Yanukovych	at	Russia’s	mercy.	Mos-
cow’s	help	would	 likely	 come	with	 specific	 conditions	 attached,	
including	membership	of	 the	Customs	Union,	which	would	end	
Ukraine’s	current	pro-EU	foreign	policy.
Meanwhile,	 the	 victory	 of	 an	 opposition	 candidate	 in	 the	 2015	
presidential	election	would	not	give	much	hope	for	change.	At	the	
moment,	the	opposition	has	been	taking	a	fairly	populist	and	re-
actionary	position	towards	the	government’s	reform	programme,	
and,	for	instance,	has	announced	plans	to	reverse	the	recent	pen-
sion	 reform51.	 So	 far,	Ukraine’s	 opposition	parties	have	not	pro-
posed	any	alternative	ideas	about	how	the	reforms	should	be	car-
ried	out.	Although	it	may	be	too	early	to	try	and	guess	what	will	
happen	in	2015,	the	most	likely	scenario	is	that	the	next	presiden-
tial	campaign	will	focus	on	the	personal	traits	of	the	candidates,	
and	 the	 opposition	will	 call	 for	 a	 change	 of	 leadership,	without	
a	coherent	plan	for	what	to	do	next.	It	has	become	quite	difficult	
50	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	“Oligarchic	democracy”,	OSW	Studies,	p.	46.
51	 A	 statement	by	Oleksandr	Turchynov,	 one	of	 the	 leaders	of	 the	Batkivsh-
chyna	party.	Турчинов пообещал отменить пенсионную реформу и лик-
видировать налоговую милицию, Українські Новини, 28.07.2012,	 http://
ukranews.com/ru/news/ukraine/2012/07/28/75656
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to	identify	any	opposition	leader	who	could	offer	real	(or	even	il-
lusory)	hope	for	systemic	reform	in	Ukraine	(as	was	the	case	with	
Viktor	Yushchenko).
Meanwhile,	 radical	 reforms	 in	 Ukraine	 are	 essential,	 as	 Kiev	
lags	ever	further	behind	the	rest	of	Europe	(currently	only	Mol-
dova	 and	 Kosovo	 are	 poorer).	 Immediately	 after	 independence,	
Ukraine’s	GDP	 per	 capita	was	 higher	 than	 in	 Bulgaria	 and	 40%	
lower	than	in	Poland;	in	2011	Poland’s	GDP	per	capita	was	already	
3.7	times	higher	than	in	Ukraine,	while	Bulgaria’s	figures	were	2	
times	higher	–	and	there	is	no	indication	that	this	trend	is	likely	
to	change52.	The	inability	to	implement	systemic	change	is	wide-
spread	across	the	CIS.	It	seems	that	the	Ukrainian	political	elite	
(both	the	government	and	the	opposition)	are	not	able	to	set	them-
selves	 apart	 from	 their	 CIS	 partners.	However,	Ukraine	 is	 cur-
rently	in	a	much	worse	situation	than,	say,	Russia	or	Azerbaijan,	
where	the	lack	of	sufficient	reforms	can	be	offset	by	high	revenues	
from	oil	and	gas	exports.	All	of	 the	above	suggests	 that	when	it	
comes	 to	 modernisation	 and	 economic	 development,	 Ukraine’s	
outlook	 for	 the	 coming	years	 remains	 fairly	bleak.	The	 country	
runs	a	serious	risk	of	being	 left	behind,	not	only	 in	comparison	
with	other	Central	and	Eastern	European	states	but	also	with	its	
direct	neighbours,	such	as	Russia.
sławomir matuszaK, arKadiusz sarna
52	 In	2011,	Ukraine’s	GDP	per capita	was	$3615.	In	Bulgaria	and	Poland	the	figure	
stood	at	$7158	and	$13463	respectively.	Source:	World	Development	Indica-
tors	 &	 Global	 Development	 Finance,	World	 Bank,	 http://databank.world-
bank.org/ddp/home.do
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